The Impact of Thierry Henry
26 Jul 2020 [football
]
After an outstanding twenty-year playing career, mercurial forward Thierry Henry entered the coaching world with the aim of emulating the success he achieved as a player.
Following stints as a youth coach at Arsenal and an assistant coach at Belgium, Henry took over the reigns of a struggling AS Monaco from Leonardo Jardim in October 2018.
However, his tenure at his childhood club came to a quick end. He was suspended by the club in January 2019 after a disappointing four wins from twenty games. It was difficult to envision Henry succeeding at Monaco. He inherited a depleted Monaco side with key players lost to transfers and a sizable number of injuries. His lack of experience as a manager led to conflicts with his players, and perhaps his lack of coaching experience prevented him from achieving his vision of replicating the playing style of Guardiola’s Barcelona.
After a short hiatus, Henry took over the role of head coach at Montreal Impact in November 2019. The Impact are a team that have not had much success over the course of their history, giving Henry the chance to mold the team as he sees fit, with the goal of making them more competitive in the MLS over the course of his tenure.
So, after a few months in charge, how do the Impact play? To answer this question, I will be taking a look at their recent game against DC United.
Montreal’s Defensive Shape
When United had the ball, Montreal’s defensive shape resembled a 4–4–2. Throughout the match, they looked to force United to distribute the ball to the wings, where it is easier for Montreal to regain possession.
When executed correctly, Montreal’s defensive shape is fluid and effective. In this game, however, they did at times struggle with winning the second ball and recovering after losing 50–50 situations. Lapses of concentration defensively also allowed United to bypass their press and create good chances.
In their 4–4–2 shape, while United’s centre backs have the ball, Montreal’s forwards do not actively press them. Instead, they use cover shadows to limit their options for vertical progression. In this case, Bojan cuts off the passing angle to the United midfielder. The United center back instead has to play the ball down the right half space to a player who is immediately pressured by Taïder.
This sequence also showcases the defensive fluidity that Montreal can play with. Corrales (Montreal’s left back, off-screen) and Wanyama react almost instantly to Taïder’s actions. Corrales moves up to fill the gap created by Taïder on the left flank, while Wanyama covers the run of the United attacking midfielder. This fluidity is key to Montreal’s defensive prowess. In this sequence, the ball is won back shortly afterward via a Wanyama interception.
Another example of this defensive strategy can be seen in the picture below with Romell Quioto:
Once the ball reaches United’s wide players, Montreal trigger a more aggressive version of their press. Their midfielders shift over to the ball-side to block passing lines to United midfielders running in behind. One or more Impact player(s) aggressively presses the player with the ball to force him to play in a 1v1 situation.
Throughout the match, this scheme was employed successfully by Montreal, allowing them to break down United’s attacking movements and regain possession consistently.
Over the course of ninety minutes, however, Montreal did show some defensive weaknesses. Maintaining the aforementioned fluidity requires a high level of communication and discipline. At times, Montreal’s players did not cover the spaces created by the aggressive pressing on the wings.
In particular, Montreal’s right sided center-back Rod Fanni has a habit of pushing up to cover the space created by Montreal’s midfielders. This leaves the last line of defense vulnerable to diagonal runs in behind.
This was exploited by United on more than one occasion, and going forward, other teams might be able to take advantage of this to create good chances.
Fanni’s pressure is necessary in these scenarios, however it can cause more harm than good if Montreal’s midfielders are not able to cover the runs that this pressure invites. This is definitely something that the team should look into if they want to improve defensively.
Montreal also struggled sometimes with their defensive positioning, due to two reasons:
Allowing the Ball to be Easily Played Past the First Line of Pressure
At times, Bojan and Quioto did not cover the passing lane to United’s midfielders. This led to a cascading effect as Wanyama and Piette were forced to leave their positions to pressure the ball.
This caused Montreal’s defensive shape to quickly unravel, and United took advantage of this with some good combination play.
Lack of Communication and Defensive Awareness
The effectiveness of Montreal’s press is highly dependent on the fluid movement of their midfielders. When there are miscommunications defensively, there are gaping holes created in Montreal’s midfield. United exploited these through quick combination play.
At times, Montreal’s midfield duo of Wanyama and Piette were often found out of position after battling for 50–50 chances. While this did not amount to many good chances created in this match, it would be easy for other teams to take advantage of this.
In the example above, Montreal’s defence collapses as their right back, Brault-Guillard is forced to move inward to press United’s left winger Asad. This allows United’s LB to run down the line, culminating in a chance created from a cross.
Montreal’s LB Corrales is also guilty of the same — at times, his positioning is too narrow, allowing United’s wide players to get into dangerous attacking positions from the right flank.
Overall, Montreal’s press, when carried out well, negated United’s offense effectively. This led to them conceding few shots from dangerous positions. There are, however, some aspects that they need to fine-tune in order to reach an elite level defensively.
Building from the Back
Montreal have a unique approach to playing out from goal kicks — their wing backs, Corrales and Brault-Guillard, are given freedom to aggressively move up the pitch, while Montreal’s midfielders, Taïder and Piette, occupy their positions. Wanyama sits in front of the center-backs as a passing option. When it works, this setup creates space for Wanyama to drive into and move the ball forward.
In the example below Wanyama was presented with a number of options to move the ball forward once United’s first line of pressure was bypassed.
Generally, Montreal looked to play the ball wide from goal kicks to attract pressure from United players. This allowed Bojan and Taïder to find advanced positions, and Montreal subsequently looked to play the ball to them, to take advantage of the space created in midfield.
However, there were very few instances in which this was successful. More often than not, Taïder and Piette occupied positions that were too advanced. This led to Montreal struggling to play past United’s first line of pressure.
Possession was often recycled in a “u-shape” between the wing backs and center backs. Montreal lost the ball in dangerous positions due to a lack of passing options, and were often forced to play long balls up the field to escape United’s high press.
Montreal instead found more success in possession with a midfield duo of Wanyama and Piette, while Rod Fanni moved out wide to cover the forward movement of Brault-Guillard, as shown in the picture below. Piette playing in a more central role gives Montreal’s defenders more passing options, while allowing Wanyama to make driving runs from deep.
They also found success with a more conservative system, where only the ball-side wing back pushed up the field. In the picture below, we can see that Brault-Guillard is positioned near the half-way line, allowing Piette to take up a role in the right half-space. Taïder and Wanyama are in the left half-space, with Taïder in a more advanced role, as opposed to covering for Corrales. This sequence led to some promising combination play, and Montreal should look to use a system similar to this going forward.
Montreal’s struggles with building out from defense were very noticeable in this game. However, they did not struggle with retaining possession in United’s half. One can interpret this as a positive sign, chalking down their problems to a system that needs improvement, rather than players lacking the technical ability to play a possession-oriented game.
Playing Through the Team’s Strengths
Montreal has two standout players in their roster — Bojan and Wanyama. Both players are in their prime years and bring different skill sets to the table.
Bojan is adept at creating chances, both for himself and others. He is often able to beat players 1-on-1 with his technical ability, while having the vision and ability to play in other Montreal players. His innate understanding of positioning consistently makes him a passing option in the buildup phase and the final third.
In this match, Bojan was given license to roam freely. He often presented himself as a passing option in the left half-space, or behind United’s midfield. His technical ability saw him used as a ball-carrier to move the ball into the final third.
However, while watching this match, one does feel that he can be used more effectively in Montreal’s system. Montreal often struggled with finding the final ball to create scoring opportunities. In my opinion, a possible solution to this lack of creativity is using Bojan more in the buildup phase.
Bojan always positions himself well to receive the ball — hence, the onus is on his teammates to find him. Once again, there is a silver lining in the cloud, as one can argue that it is easier to train passing the ball to Bojan, rather than teaching Bojan how to position himself. If Montreal modifies their system of playing out from the back, this change should be simple enough to implement.
When given the opportunity to, Wanyama made promising late runs into the final third and linked up well with Montreal’s attackers. These opportunities did not present themselves often, however, as he was tasked with playing in a more conservative role to balance out the attacking movement of Piette and Taïder. Playing him in a midfield duo could allow Montreal to make the most out of his skillset, giving him license to make late runs and create chances with his link-up play.
If Montreal wants to achieve success consistently, they should make the most out of the abilities of their stars, and I am sure Henry will look into this going forward.
Conclusion
In this 1–0 win against DC United, Montreal showcased a competent and effective defensive scheme, along with the occasional flashes of fluid, dangerous attacking plays.
However, going forward, Henry should look to limit his team’s lapses of concentration defensively and look at changing the way in which his team plays out from the back. To improve Montreal’s chance creation, he should look to make Bojan the focal point of this team, while using Wanyama more extensively to win the battle in midfield.